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NOTES
GROWING PAINS FOR THE BOARD OF
PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES:
A PLAN FOR RESTORING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
INTRODUCTION

The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)1 bears the responsibility for the issuance of patents2 to inventors for novel3 and
unobvious 4 inventions.5 However, patent examiners may reject a
patent application if they believe that an invention fails to meet
these statutory requirements. In such cases, the inventor may
appeal the examiner's decision to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (Board).' On appeal, a panel of Board members
reviews the patent application and the record of action regarding
the application in the PTO to decide whether to grant a patent in

1. "The Patent and Trademark Office shall continue as an office in the Department of Commerce, where records, books, drawings, specifications, and other papers and things pertaining to patents and to trademark registrations shall be kept
and preserved, except as otherwise provided by law." 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The
PTO, "accepts and examines applications for the issuance of patents on inventions
and for the registration of rights in trademarks, service marks, certification marks
and collective marks." 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTABILITY, § G1-16 (1995).
2. A patent grants an inventor the right to exclude others from making, using
or selling the subject matter of an invention for a term of 20 years from the date of
filing. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995). This term is a change from the
former which provided patent protection 17 years from the date of issuance. See id.
The change in term was enacted as a part of GATT and went into effect in June,
1995. See id.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). The requirement for novelty in § 102 bars any invention from consideration for patent protection where knowledge of the invention
is already available to the public in some form. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). An inventor cannot obtain patent protection for an
invention if the difference between the subject matter of the invention and the
prior art is such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would find the invention
to be obvious. Grahm v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966).
5. Invention is "the act or operation of finding out something new; the process
of contriving and producing something not previously known or existing, by the
exercise of independent investigation and experiment. Also the article or contrivance or composition so invented." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 824 (6th ed. 1990).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988). See infra note 63 for the relevant text of this statute.
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opposition to the examiner's decision.7 While the procedure governing appeals to the Board is found within 35 U.S.C. § 7, the
applicant is not assured of an independent review because the
Commissioner of the PTO has used the ambiguous language in
the provision to predetermine the outcome of certain appeals.'
The Commissioner of the PTO has relied on the ambiguity of
§ 7 to justify reversal of Board decisions, even though § 7 gives
"[t]he Board" sole authority to grant rehearings of Board decisions.9 This occurs because the statute does not detail with specificity which Board members may authorize such review." For
example, on two occasions the Commissioner authorized rehearings when he disagreed with Board decisions granting patents in
applications which had previously been denied by the patent examiner.'1 These rehearings resulted in reversals of the Board
decisions. 12 To ensure a decision according to his opinion, the
Commissioner appointed new panels with Board members whom
he trusted to vote according to his opinion. 3 Even though a majority of Board members protest the Commissioner's interference
in the appeal of PTO decisions,' 4 the Commissioner may continue to assert the right to influence the appellate process. Moreover,
in appellate review of the propriety of one of these rehearings, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) condoned the
Commissioner's actions, giving 15deference to his judgment and
interpretation of the Patent Act.

7. 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988).
8. See infra notes 121-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Commissioner's interference with the Board's decisions in Ex parte Akamatsu and
Ex parte Alappat.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988). See infra note 63 for the relevant text of this statute.
10. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1927 and, specifically, the debates in the House
and Senate Committees on Patents regarding the meaning of 'The Board" in 35
U.S.C. § 7.
11. See infra notes 121-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Commissioner's actions relating to Ex parte Akamatsu and Ex parte Alappat.
12. See infra notes 126-30, 154-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Commissioner's actions in setting aside the decisions of Board panels in Ex parte
Akamatsu and Ex parte Alappat and appointing new panels composed of Board
members that would vote in favor of his position.
13. See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Examiners-in-Chiefs protest of the Commissioner's interference with Board independence and the Commissioner's response asserting his authority to regulate PTO
policy through Board decisions.
14. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Board's memorandum, signed by 33 of the 44 Examiners-in-Chief, protesting the
Commissioner's interference with the Board's independence.
15. See infra notes 164-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
CAFC's holding in In re Alappat relating to the issue of Board independence from
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Notwithstanding the Commissioner's actions and the deference given to him by the CAFC, Congress did not intend to give
the Commissioner the authority to control Board decisions when it
passed the Patent Act of 1927. In the enactment of this legislation, the Commissioner relinquished the power to personally hear
patent appeals in exchange for more efficient procedures in the
Patent Office. 6 While the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners were added as members of the Board, their roles were
primarily intended to expand the number of panels that could sit
simultaneously, thus increasing the number of appeals which the
Board could hear at any one time. i" The Act gave the Commissioner authority only to designate the membership of panels in
order to align the technical skills of the Board members with the
subject matter of the appeal, not to predetermine the outcome of
Board appeals by "stacking" the panel with allies.1
As a consequence of the Commissioner's interference, the
participants in the appellate process are adversely affected. These
applicants face additional costs, time and uncertainty over the
rules that the Commissioner will apply. Additionally, the Commissioner has frustrated and offended the Board members by impinging upon their independence.
This Note examines the issue of the lack of independence
currently given the Board resulting from the Commissioner of the
PTO's interference in Board decisions. Part I chronicles the development of the appellate process within the PTO. Part II details
the circumstances that led to the current dispute within the PTO.
Part III analyzes the legislative intent of the drafters of the current patent statute. Lastly, this Note proposes an amendment to §
7 of the Patent Act intended to restore the judicial independence
of the Board while preserving the Commissioner's authority to set
and enforce PTO policy.

influence by the Commissioner. Where a statute is silent or ambiguous on a specific issue, courts must defer to the interpretation given by the administrator of the
agency with the authority to enforce the statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). Deference by the
court is required unless the interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the intent of the statute. Id. See generally Robert A. Anthony, Which
Agency InterpretationsShould Get JudicialDeference? - A PreliminaryInquiry, 40
ADMIN. L. REV. 121 (1988).
16. See infra notes 178-216 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative intent of the Act of March 2, 1927.
17. See infra notes 178-201, 217-30 and accompanying text discussing
Congress's intent in adding the Commissioner and two Assistant Commissioners to
the Board along with the five or six Examiners-in-Chief, allowing the Board to sit
in two or three panels simultaneously to hear appeals.
18. See infra note 229 for a description of Congress's concept of the proper use
of authority by the Commissioner to appoint Board panels aligning Examiners-inChief skills with appeal subject matter.
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE PATENT APPEALS PROCESS
The evolution of the patent application process required the
development of the patent appellate process. Originally, the Secretary of State, then Thomas Jefferson, approved patents by signing
properly filed patent applications. Today, the Commissioner of the
PTO signs patent applications approved by a patent examiner
only after a rigorous examination of the application or, on appeal
from an examiner's rejection, a patent application approved by a
panel of the Board. This Section discusses the development of the
patent appellate process starting from the Constitutional grant of
authority which mandated that the federal government regulate
patents, up to and including the inception of judicial appeals under the Patent Act of 1839. This Section then discusses the evolution and codification in 1861 of the internal procedures that developed in the Patent Office in response to the marked increase in
patent applications between 1840 and 1860. Finally, this Section
discusses the Patent Act of 1927 which established what essentially constitutes the present Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.
A. 1789-1861: The Existence of a Cumbersome Informal
Appellate Process
The Constitution granted Congress the authority to enact
legislation "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 9
The first patent statute, enacted in 1790,20 and amended in
1793,21 gave the responsibility for granting patents to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Attorney General.22
From 1790 until 1836, an inventor could obtain a patent on demand from the government merely by properly filing a patent
application. 2 As such, during this period, appeals did not generally occur.24

19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Congress shall have Power "[t]o promote

the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
20. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 STAT. 109, 109-10.
21. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 STAT. 318-23.
22. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); P.J. Federico,
Evolution of Patent Office Appeals, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 838, 838 (1940).
23. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1549-51 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (discussing the legislative histories of Patent Acts from 1790 to 1927); see
also Michael W. Blommer, The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, AIPLA
BULL. 188, 190-93 (1992) (discussing the circumstances surrounding the enactment
of patent appeals statutes from 1861 through 1927); see also Federico, supra note
22, at 838-64, 920-49 (discussing generally the history of patent office appeals).
24. Federico, supra note 22, at 838.
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Eventually, the public became critical of the system, believing
that the government was issuing too many invalid patents.2 5 In
response to this criticism, the Patent Act of 1836 (Act of 1836)26
established the Patent Office and provided statutory grounds for
its Commissioner to refuse patent applications.2 v The Senate
Committee that introduced the amendment realized that the power to refuse patents also necessitated the establishment of an
appellate process. 28 Therefore, ,the Act of 1836 provided for a
panel of three disinterested arbitrators, selected by the Secretary
of State on a case-by-case basis, to hear applicants' appeals.29
Once selected, the panel members were required by oath to act
faithfully and impartially. 30 The Act of 1836 required the panels
to observe minimal judicial procedures, 3' and made the decisions
of the panels binding on the Commissioner.32
This appellate process proved difficult to administer. 33 Typically two to five hearings were required before the board could
reach a final decision.34 The length of the process, coupled with
the fact that each arbitrator received no more than the nominal
fee of ten dollars per appeal, made it increasingly difficult for the
Secretary of State to locate people willing to participate in more
than one hearing. 35 This high turnover also resulted in inconsis-

25. Blommer, supra note 23, at 190. Public distrust resulted from the Patent
Office's lack of manpower and its failure to properly maintain procedures to keep
the patent application and issuance process functioning. Id.
26. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 5 STAT. 117.
27. Federico, supra note 22, at 839.
28. Id. at 838-39.
29. Id. at 839.
30. Id.
31. Id. After receiving the written opinion of the Commissioner's decision, the
board had to provide reasonable notice to the Commissioner and the applicant of
the time and the place for the hearing. Id. Both sides had the opportunity to furnish the board with whatever additional facts and evidence were necessary to
arrive at a just decision. Id. After examining all the evidence presented, the board
had the authority to reverse the Commissioner's rejection of the application. Id. at
839-40.
32. Federico, supra note 22, at 840. The Board's decision was final in ex parte
cases and in cases of interferences between two applicants. Id. However, review
under a Bill in Equity was possible in the case of an interference between an issued patent and a patent application. Id.
33. Id. at 841-42. When the appeal was accepted, the Secretary of State wrote
to three persons requesting that they serve on the board. Id. at 841. If any of those
contacted declined to participate, the Secretary had to contact additional persons
until the board was filled. Id. Once three persons agreed to serve on the board,
they met and established the procedures for the hearing. Id. at 841-42. The board
then contacted the Commissioner and the applicant to schedule the hearing. Id. at
842.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 840 n.5, 842. In the nine appeals in 1838, 15 different people participated as board members. Id. at 841.
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tent procedures and rulings.38 Eventually, based on the recommendations of the Commissioner, Congress passed the Patent Act
of 1839 (Act of 1839). 3 7 The Act of 1839 gave jurisdiction for patent appeals to the Chief Justice of the United States for the District Court of the District of Columbia.3 8
The Patent Office became a busy place in succeeding years as
the number of applications filed increased from 765 in 1840 to
7,653 in 1860. 39 Consequently, the Commissioners could not adequately perform both their admiiistrative duties and devote individual attention to each patent application.4" The Commissioners were thus forced to delegate some of their authority to other
members of the Patent Office in order to manage the ever-growing
workload.4 '
B. The Patent Act of 1861: Official Delegation of Authority
Within the Patent Office
To improve efficiency, the various Commissioners made informal procedural changes within the Patent Office.42 The Commissioners began to delegate decision making authority to the primary examiners who reviewed patent applications.4 3 In cases where
the applicant disagreed with the examiner's decision, the examiner turned over the application to the Commissioner for a final
decision." Eventually, the Commissioners began appointing "informal boards" consisting of two or more examiners to act on the
Commissioner's behalf to decide appeals. 45 The internal appellate
procedures reduced the workload on the Commissioners. 46 However, the decisions by the "informal boards" lacked uniformity because the examiners constantly rotated board positions.47
The Patent Act of 1861 (Act of 1861) 48 essentially codified
the internal appellate process of the Patent Office. 49 The Act of

36. Id. at 842.
37. Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 88, 5 Stat. 353.
38. Federico, supra note 22, at 843.
39. Blommer, supra note 23, at 190. In 1850, there were 2,193 applications. Id.
40. Id.; Federico, supra note 22, at 854.
41. Federico, supra note 22, at 854-55. Commissioner Eubank was probably the
first to delegate authority to other examiners to investigate a case. Id. at 855.
42. Blommer, supra note 23, at 190; Federico, supra note 22, at 854-56.
43. Federico, supra note 22, at 854.

44. Id.
45. Blommer, supra note 23, at 190. In 1857, Commissioner Holt wrote a letter
to Congress explaining the growing inability of the Commissioner to hear all appeals in person. Id. He suggested that an "informal board" could aid the Commissioner in deciding appeals. Id.
46. Id.

47. Id.
48. Act of March 12, 1861, ch. 88, § 2, 12 STAT. 246.
49. See Blommer, supra note 23, at 190; Federico, supra note 22, at 856.
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1861 established a permanent three-member Board of Examinersin-Chief (EICs)5 ° to hear appeals. The applicant had two appeals
within the Patent Office: first, a direct appeal to the Board of
EICs from the examiner's decision; second, an appeal to the Commissioner from the Board's decision.5 1 The applicant also held
the right to appeal the final decision of the Patent Office to the
District Court for the District of Columbia. This procedure remained essentially unchanged until the Patent Act of 1927.52
C. The Patent Act of 1927: The Commissioner Surrenders
Appellate Power in Exchange for Efficiency
While more efficient than the early practice within the Patent Office, the appellate system established by the Act of 1861
was an expensive and time consuming process for an applicant. 3
The Act of March 2, 1927 (Act of 1927)"4 resulted from a compro50. Act of March 12, 1861, ch. 88, § 2, 12 STAT. 246. Examiners-in-Chief were
defined as "persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability." Id.; see
also 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1988); Act of March 2, 1927, ch. 273, § 3, 44 STAT. 1335.
51. Federico, supra note 22, at 857.
52. Id. at 857-64, 920-23, 931-33. The appellate process within the Patent Office
remained static from 1861 until the Patent Act of 1927. See infra notes 53-59 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Patent Act of 1927. However, appeals to
the federal court system changed drastically during the 66 years between the acts.
Federico, supra note 22, at 857-64, 920-23, 931-33.
In 1863, Congress abolished the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
and created the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Id. at 857. Patent
appellants had the option of bringing their appeal before the Chief Justice or any
of the three Associate Justices, whichever the appellant felt would render a favorable ruling. Id. at 857-60. Eventually, defects in the system and complaints from
the Patent Office resulted in provisions in the Act of July 8, 1870, requiring the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting en banc to hear all patent appeals. Id. at 920-22. Subsequently, the Judiciary Act of 1893 established the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, vesting the new court with jurisdiction over
patent appeals. Id. at 931-33. The Court of Appeals retained authority over patent
appeals from 1893 until 1929. See Steven W. Lundberg & John C. Reich, Identifying MathematicalAlgorithms in Patent Claims, COMPUTER LAW., Sept. 1993, at 2.

53. Blommer, supra note 23, at 190-92; Federico, supra note 22, at 941-44. In
1926, the estimated duration of an appeal within the Patent Office was 15 months;
nine months for the Board appeal and six months for the Commissioner's appeal.
H.R. REP. No. 1889, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1927).
54. Act of March 2, 1927, ch. 273, § 3, 44 Stat. 1335. The Act stated in relevant
part:
The examiners in chief shall be persons of competent legal knowledge and
scientific ability. The Commissioner of Patents, the first assistant commissioner, the assistant commissioner, and the examiners in chief shall constitute a board of appeals, whose duty is shall be, on written petition of the
appellant, to review and determine upon the validity of the adverse decisions of examiners upon applications for patents and for reissues of patents .... Each appeal shall be heard by at least three members of the board
of appeals, the members hearing such appeal to be designated by the commissioner. The board of appeals shall have sole power to grant rehearings.
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mise between parties who desired to accelerate the appellate process within the Patent Office and those who opposed reducing the
Commissioner's supervisory authority over the Board.55 The Act
of 1927 eliminated the direct appeal to the Commissioner.5 6 The
Commissioner and two Assistant Commissioners were also added
to the Board.57 Additionally, the Act of 1927 gave the Commissioner the authority to assign EICs to panels consisting of three or
more Board members who were authorized to hear appeals.58
The language used in the Act of 1927 remains essentially unchanged in the currently applicable statute, 35 U.S.C. § 7.59

II. THE COMMISSIONER OF THE PTO IMPINGES UPON THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE BOARD

Conflict between the Commissioner and the Board arose
when the Commissioner improperly expanded Board panels to
reconsider certain appeals.6" The precedent of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)6 ' and the CAFC indicates that
the Commissioner holds the authority to appoint an expanded
panel at the beginning of an appeal.62 However, the Commission-

Id. See infra note 63 for the relevant portions of the current version at 35 U.S.C. §
7.
55. Blommer, supra note 23, at 192-94. See infra notes 174-232 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history of the Act of 1927.
56. Act of March 2, 1927, ch. 273, § 6, 44 STAT. 1336.
57. Blommer, supra note 23, at 192. The original draft of the bill required either the Commissioner or an Assistant Commissioner sit on each three-member
panel assigned to hear an appeal. Id. The American Bar Association opposed the
bill as presented because no panels could convene if the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners were unavailable. Id. The bill as enacted allowed any three
members of the Board to constitute a quorum. Id.
58. Id.
59. See infra note 63 for the relevant text of 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
60. See infra notes 121-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Commissioner's improper actions in the Akamatsu and Alappat decisions.
However, the Commissioner has properly convened expanded Board panels in
other cases. See, e.g., Exparte Alpha Industries Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1851, 1852 (Bd.
of Pat. App. and Int. 1992) (convening five-member panel); Ex parte Fujii, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d 1073, 1074 (Bd. of Pat. App. and Int. 1989) (convening five-member
panel based on significance of issue raised); Ex parte Kristensen, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
1701, 1702 (Bd. of Pat. App. and Int. 1989) (convening five-member panel); Ex
parte Kitamura, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1787, 1788 (Bd. of Pat. App. and Int. 1988) (convening five-member panel because of possible conflict in case law); Ex parte Horton,
226 U.S.P.Q. 697, 698 (Bd. of Pat. App. and Int. 1985) (convening five-member
panel).
61. See Lundberg & Reich, supra note 52, at 2 n.9. The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals held appellate jurisdiction for the PTO from 1929 to 1982. Id. In
1982, the CCPA was dissolved and the CAFC was simultaneously created and assigned jurisdiction in the same act. Id.
62. See Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reviewing decision
of seven-member panel convened based on significance of issue raised); In re
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er improperly expanded panels late in the appeals process in two
appeals, thus exceeding the authority granted to him by 35 U.S.C.
§ 7(b).6 3 As such, the Commissioner's recent conduct in expanding the panels in the patent appeals of Norio Akamatsu' and
Kuriappan Alappat6 5 raises questions regarding the relationship
between the Commissioner and the Board, and Congress should
accordingly reevaluate the appellate process within the PTO.
This Section begins with a discussion of the patent application process and the flexibility available to the inventor in claiming an invention. This Section then discusses the dispute between
the Commissioner of the PTO and the CAFC over the interpretation of certain types of claims during the patent examination
process. Finally, this Section discusses Ex parte Akamatsu 66 and
Ex parte Alappat" two cases where the dispute with the CAFC
motivated the Commissioner to impinge upon the judicial independence of the Board.
A. The Patent Act Allows an Inventor Flexibility to Claim Both
Broad and Narrow Protectionfor an Invention
The PTO will issue a patent to anyone who invents a new
and useful process," machine, manufacture,69 or composition of

Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reviewing decision of 18 member
panel); In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reviewing decision of
16 member panel); In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253, 254 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (reviewing decision of nine-member panel convened based on the nature of the legal issue
raised).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988). The statute states in relevant part:
(a) The examiners-in-chief shall be persons of competent legal knowledge
and scientific ability, who shall be appointed to the competitive service. The
Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, and
the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences.
(b) The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall, on written appeal
of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners upon applications for
patents.... Each appeal.., shall be heard by at least three members of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, who shall be designated by the
Commissioner. Only the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has the
authority to grant rehearings.
Id.
64. See infra notes 121-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Akamatsu decision and its ramifications within the PTO.
65. See infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Alappat decision.
66. 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1915 (Bd. of Pat. App. and Int. 1992).
67. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1988). The term "process" denotes "an act or a series of
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery" regardless of whether the machinery pointed out as suitable to perform
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matter v7 or a new and useful improvement on a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. 7' This grant is
subject to other conditions contained in Title 35,72 such as novelty 7' and unobviousness. 74 To obtain a patent, the inventor submits a written application to the Commissioner of the PTO.75
The application must include a specification of the invention,7 6 a

the process is new or patentable. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981).
69. "Manufacture" denotes "the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or
combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery." Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
70. "Composition of matter" denotes "all compositions of two or more substances
and ... all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids." Id.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." Id.
72. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1988); 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988 & Supp. 1993); 35 U.S.C.
§ 105 (Supp. 1993).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). In relevant part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent; or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States;...
Id.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). In relevant part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains....
Id.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988).
76. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). In relevant part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention. The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention.
Id. In patent law, patent claims serve two functions. First, the claims will define
the invention for the purpose of applying the conditions of patentability; second,
claims define the invention for the purpose of determining whether another party
is infringing the scope of the patent. 2 CHISUM, supra note 1, at §§ 8-3, 8-4.

19951

Growing Painsfor the Board

181

drawing of the invention,7 7 an oath certifying his belief that he is
the original inventor78 and the filing fee.79
The inventor is permitted to present claims for apparatus
and methods" of varying scope in a single application," which
allows wide latitude for protection of an invention.8 2 For example, the inventor may make a broad claim for an apparatus as
general as a chair, or make a narrow claim for a specific invention
of a chair with an automatic reclining mechanism, inflatable lumbar support and built-in massager. Additionally, the inventor may
make claims for the chair in any one or a combination of the elements of the reclining mechanism, the lumbar support and the
massager. Moreover, each claim is evaluated independently of the
other claims. 3 The examiner may allow protection for individual
claims in an application even though one or more of the other
claims in the application is rejected.
The inventor also holds wide latitude in specifying the elements of an apparatus claim or a method claim. In the claim, the
inventor may express an element of the claim in great detail, or
may recite the requirements for the element broadly, as a means
for performing a specified function.84 The latter expression is referred to as "means-plus-function" language. 5
As an example, the above-described claim for the chair contains the elements of four legs and a seat. The inventor may
broadly state that the legs and seat are attached with a means for
fastening. The claim drafted in means-plus-function terms would
provide the inventor protection against chairs assembled with
screws, bolts, dowels, glue or any other item that performs the
function of fastening. However, because the claim provides broad
protection, the examiner may reject the claim if a prior art reference 6 exists for a chair with four legs assembled using any
77. 35 U.S.C. § 113 (1988).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1988). "The applicant shall make [an] oath that he believes
himself to be the original and first inventor of the process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or improvement thereof, for which he solicits a patent;
and shall state of what country he is a citizen." Id.
79. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988).
80. A method is "[tihe mode of operating, or the means of attaining an object .... Method, properly speaking, is only placing several things, or performing
several operations, in the most convenient order, but it may signify a contrivance
or device." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 991 (6th ed. 1990).

81. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). See supra note 76 for the relevant text of this statutory provision.
82. In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 548 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
83. Id. at 547.
84. Id. at 548.
85. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989). An element expressed
in means-plus-function terms does not specify the structures, materials, or acts
necessary to support the function. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). The term "prior art" denotes existing knowledge,
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means for fastening.
In the alternative, the inventor may specifically state in the
claim that the legs and seat are attached with 1/4"-20 x 1 1/2"
Phillips hex head screws. The inventor would receive the right to
exclude others from making chairs assembled with the specified
screws. The protection awarded for such a specific claim is narrower than the protection for the broad claim, but the examiner is
also less likely to reject the narrow claim. To bar the claim, a
prior art reference must specify the exact means for fastening
contained in the narrow claim, i.e., the hex head screw. 7
The example illustrates the trade-off between claim specificity and protection: broad claims allow greater protection but are
more likely to be anticipated by a prior art reference; narrow
claims provide less protection but are less likely to have a prior
art reference. Moreover, the factors considered are more complex
in sophisticated technological areas, such as computer software.88
The complexity surrounding the interpretation of computer software claims initiated the current dispute between the Commissioner and the CAFC. This dispute ultimately resulted in the
Commissioner impinging upon the judicial independence of the
Board.
B. The Commissioner Rejects the Federal Circuit'sNarrow
Interpretationof Patent Claims
During its existence, the CCPA required that the Patent
Office give a broad interpretation to claims expressed in meansplus-function terms. In the 1957 case of In re Lundberg,89 the
inventor appealed in an attempt to overturn a rejection of his
claims for an apparatus and method for searching for mineral
deposits from an airplane. 9°On appeal before the CCPA, the inventor argued that the court should give a narrow interpretation
to the means-plus-function terms by limiting the claims to the

literature references, patents, or known uses of the invention that antedate the
invention at issue. Mooney v. Brunswick Corp., 663 F.2d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 1981);
see also American Standard Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 86, 125 (D. Del. 1989).
87. As stated previously, this simple example is subject to the other conditions
for patentability, such as novelty and unobviousness. See supra notes 68-79 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory requirements for patenting an
invention.
88. The difference between specifying a ROM (read-only-memory) for retrieving
the square of a number and a means for retrieving the square of a number determines whether a claim is patentable subject matter under §101. See infra notes 99106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the CAFC's decision in In re
Iwahashi.
89. 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
90. Id. at 544. A panel of the Board affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims
containing means-plus-function limitations for reading on the prior art. Id.
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structures described in the specification. 9' However, the court
refused to adopt the inventor's interpretation of the rejected
claims.92 In so ruling, the court held that the patent specification
statute, § 112, requires that the claim particularly set out the
subject matter the inventor considers his invention. 93
The Lundberg court looked at the legislative history of the
Patent Act and found that Congress did not intend to destroy the
basic precept of patent law that "the claim is the measure of the
invention."94 The Lundberg court reasoned that adopting the
appellant's argument would eliminate the broad protection available to inventors under the existing patent laws. 95 By limiting
the means-plus-function terms, the proposed construction would
eliminate the distinction between broad and narrow claims.96
The court concluded that applicants may not rely on the specification to impart patentability to an otherwise unpatentable
97
claim.
Later rulings by the CCPA and its successor court, the CAFC,
accepted the broad interpretation of means-plus-function terms
until In re Iwahashi.9' The issue on appeal in Iwahashi related
to a claim for a simplified, cost-effective device for calculating
correlation coefficients used in voice recognition.99 The Board
affirmed an examiner's rejection of the application by holding that
the claimed invention was an unpatentable mathematical
algorithm." ° The rejected claim contained several elements ex-

91. Id. The appellant expressed. his claims in terms of an apparatus with elements "adapted" to perform functions. Id. at 544-45. For purposes of the appeal,
the Court construed the term "adapted" as equivalent to "means" as contemplated
in 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 546. See supra note 76 for the relevant text of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.
92. Lundberg, 244 F.2d at 546.
93. Id. at 547.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 547-48. The application contained both broad and narrow claims for
protection. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that appellant likely did not contemplate that adoption of his argument would eliminate the broad protection afforded
inventors. Id. at 548.
96. Id. at 547-48. The specification disclosed in the application would restrict
the breadth of protection normally granted with a broad claim although the claim
was drafted expansively. Id.
97. Id. at 548.
98. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 1371. The claimed process performed a comparison of a voice signal
sample to stored voice signal samples. Id. A correlation coefficient is a statistic related to the probability that the compared signals have the same origin. Id. The inventor claimed that his process for calculating correlation coefficients was less
expensive and more accurate at high speeds. Id. at 1371-72.
100. Id. at 1370. An algorithm is a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). "The broader definition of algorithm is 'a step-by-step procedure for solving a problem or accomplish-
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ing some end."' Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1374 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (1976)).
In Benson, the Court held that a software program that represents nothing
more than a mathematical algorithm is not patentable where it would wholly preempt the use of the algorithm. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72. The inventor sought a
patent on a method of programming a general-purpose digital computer to convert
a number from binary-coded decimal (BCD) format to a pure binary number. Id. at
64-67. The BCD system replaces each decimal numeral in a number with the
equivalent binary number. Id. at 66. In BCD, the number 39 is represented by
0011 1001, because the decimal 3 is equal to binary 0011 and decimal 9 is equal to
binary 1001. Id. at 67. In the binary system, decimal 39 is equal to binary 100111.
Id. at 66. The claimed invention was a computer programmed to perform the conversion of BCD 0011 1001 to binary 100111. Id. The Court observed that the
claimed invention was a mathematical procedure carried out on an existing computer. Id. The Court found that the mathematical formula claimed had no practical
application except in relation to the claimed device. Id. at 71. The Court held that
a patent granted for the only practical use of the formula would have the effect of
patenting the algorithm itself. Id. at 72. The Court found that mathematical algorithms fall into the category of natural phenomena, mental processes and abstract
intellectual concepts which are not patentable. Id. at 67.
In Parker v. Flook, the applicant attempted to distinguish his claim from
Benson by arguing that his claim was limited by specific post-solution activity and,
therefore, did not wholly preempt the mathematical algorithm. Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 589-95 (1978). Flook claimed a method for updating alarm limits
during a catalytic conversion process. Id. at 585. The method was a three-step
process of first measuring the values of relevant process variables, such as temperature and pressure, then using an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm limit
value and finally adjusting the alarm limit to the updated value. Id. The only improvement over existing methods of updating alarm limits was the automation of
the second step of the process. Id. at 586. Additionally, the claim was limited to
application in the petrochemical and oil refining industries. Id. The inventor argued that the specific post-solution activity of updating the alarm limits was sufficient to distinguish his claim from Benson and to constitute a claim for patentable
subject matter. Id. at 590. The Court was unimpressed by the argument and affirmed the rejection of the claim. Id. The Court reasoned that if Flook's argument
was accepted any competent draftsman could attach some post-solution activity
and make an otherwise unpatentable algorithm patentable. Id.
In Diamond v. Diehr,the Court held that a claim may contain a mathematical algorithm and still constitute patentable subject matter. Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981). The claimed invention was a method for manufacturing
molded articles in a rubber molding press. Id. at 181. The steps in the process
included preheating the mold, installing the unmolded rubber in the mold, closing
the press, initiating a timer to monitor the elapsed time since closing, heating the
mold to maintain its temperature during closure, monitoring the temperature,
calculating the reaction time at periodic intervals, comparing the calculated reaction time to the elapsed time and opening the press when the reaction time equals
the elapsed time. Id. The step calculating the reaction time involved the solution of
a mathematical algorithm. Id. The algorithm was one element of the extensive
process for curing rubber. Id. at 177-81. The Court held that whether a claim constitutes patentable subject matter is determined by evaluating the claim as a
whole. Id. at 187. The Court concluded that "a claim drawn to patentable subject
matter does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer." Id.
Diehr was the last case heard by the Supreme Court on the issue of patent-
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pressed in means-plus-function form and one element referring to
a specific apparatus, a ROM (read-only-memory).' 0 ' The CAFC
reversed the rejection, holding that the claim did not wholly preempt the algorithm, and, as such, defined a patentable invention.1 2 In so ruling, the court found particularly persuasive the
presence of the ROM element along with the means-plus-function
elements.0 3 The court also responded to the PTO's collateral argument that the means-plus-function expressions "encompassed
any and every means for performing the functions recited therein."' Unlike the Lundberg court, the Iwahashi court held that
the PTO must interpret means-plus-function claims narrowly and
that each means-plus-function element is limited by the specifications disclosed in the application.' 5 However, notwithstanding
the precedential nature of the CAFC's opinion,0 60 7the PTO chose
not to follow the reasoning of the Iwahashi court.
In February of 1990, then acting Assistant Commissioner for
Patents, James E. Denny, published a notice announcing the

ability of mathematical algorithms. See generally Lundberg & Reich, supra note 52
(discussing the current standards for patenting mathematical algorithms as developed by the CCPA and the CAFC subsequent to Diehr, including the identification
of mathematical algorithms under the Freeman-Walter-Abele test).
101. Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1370-73. The appealed claim as represented in the
opinion read:
[a] An auto-correlation unit for providing auto-correlation coefficients for
use as feature parameters in pattern recognition for N pieces of sampled
input values .... said unit comprising:
[b] means for extracting N pieces of sample input values ... from a series of
sample values in an input pattern... ;
[c] means for calculating the sum of the sample values ... ;
[d] a read only memory associated with said means for calculating;
[e] means for feeding to said read only memory the sum of the sampled input values as an address signal;
[f] means for storing in said read only memory the squared value of each
sum;
[g] means for fetching and outputting the squared values of each such sum
of the sample input values from said read only memory;....
[hi means responsive to the output... of said read only memory for providing an auto-correlation coefficient for use as a feature parameter....
Id. at 1373 (emphasis added).
Read Only Memory, or "ROM," is stored permanently in a computer to provide it with operating instructions. Cairn McGregor, PersonalComputing, MONTREAL GAZETTE, May 1, 1993, at J2. The information contained in ROM is generally
installed in the computer at the time of manufacture. Id.
102. Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1374-75.
103. Id. at 1375.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(4) (1988).
107. PTO Interpretationof In re Iwahashi, 39 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) No. 972, at 399 (Mar. 15, 1990) [hereinafter PTO Interpretation].
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PTO's interpretation of the Iwahashi decision. °8 While conceding that the CAFC's holding was not inconsistent with the policies
and precedents under which the PTO operated, °9 Denny's notice
asserted that Iwahashi's claim was distinguishable from claims
drafted exclusively in means-plus-function terms due to the presence of the specific apparatus, the ROM."' Denny discounted
the court's statements related to claim interpretation by referring
to them as "dicta."'
Furthermore, the PTO reasserted the
CCPA's position that a claim operates as the measure of the invention."' The Commissioner stated that the examiners should
continue to give means-plus-function terms the broadest reason3
able interpretation.1
The CAFC disregarded the opinions of the PTO in reaffirming the reasoning of the Iwahashi decision in its per curiam opinion in In re Bond."4 Bond involved an appeal from the Board's
rejection of a claim, expressed in means-plus-function form, for a
remote turn-on feature for a telephone answering machine." 5
The Bond court vacated the Board's decision because, by interpreting the claim broadly, the Board failed to make a factual
determination of whether the claim was structurally equivalent to
the prior art." 6 Accordingly, the court remanded the appeal to
the Board to make findings of fact based on a narrow reading of
7
the claim, consistent with the holding in Iwahashi.1
Despite the CAFC's reaffirmation that the PTO was required
to interpret claims narrowly, the PTO continued to ignore the
CAFC's decisions. In December of 1990, then Commissioner Harry
F. Manbeck issued an internal directive expressing the view that
Lundberg still controlled interpretation of means-plus-function
claims, thus requiring PTO examiners to read means-plus-function claims broadly."' Manbeck also declared that Lundberg re-

108. Id.
109. Id. The notice stated that the claim drafted with the ROM "carried the
[appellant's] burden of demonstrating that the claim was truly drawn to a specific
apparatus distinct from other apparatus capable of performing the identical functions." Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 400.
112. PTO Interpretation,supra note 107, at 400.
113. Id.
114. 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
115. Id. at 832.
116. Id. at 833-34. In applying § 112, para. 6, the Board must make additional
determinations regarding questions of fact. Id.; see also Pennwalt Corp. v. DurandWayland, 833 F.2d 931, 933-34 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The Court vacated the Board's
decision because it could not rule on the merits of the case without the necessary
factual determinations. Bond, 910 F.2d at 833-34.
117. Bond, 910 F.2d at 833.
118. PTO Issues Directive to Examiners on Means-Plus-FunctionEquivalency, 41
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mained binding precedent and that only the CAFC sitting en
banc"9 could overrule Lundberg.2
C. The Commissioner's Dispute with the CAFC Impinges Upon
Board Independence
The first encroachment by the Commissioner upon the independence of the Board occurred in Ex parte Akamatsu."2 l In this
case, the examiner rejected two claims containing means-plusfunction elements by stating that the applicant failed to claim
patentable subject matter.122 The Board panel, consistent with
Lundberg, affirmed the examiner's rejection of the claims, holding
that the claims represented mathematical algorithms which did
not constitute patentable subject matter. 123 Additionally, the
Board panel took the opportunity to discount the CAFC's holding
in Iwahashi."' In rejecting the two claims containing meansplus-function language, the Board panel distinguished Iwahashi
the CAFC's narrow interpretation
on its facts and ignored as dicta
125
of means-plus-function terms.
Notwithstanding the holding of Akamatsu. the opinion of the

PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1022, at 411 (Mar. 14, 1991) [herein-

after PTO Directive].
119. En banc "[r]efers to a session where the entire membership of the court will
participate in the decision rather than the regular quorum.... [W]hen the issues
involved are unusually novel or of wide impact, the case will be heard and decided
by the full court sitting en banc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526-27 (6th ed. 1990).
120. PTO Directive, supra note 118, at 412. The Commissioner's position was
based on the CAFC's first published decision at its inception in 1982. South Corp.
v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982). In this case, the CAFC sat en
banc to determine the body of case law it would adopt as its precedent. Id. The
Court felt that "starting from scratch" would result in years of delay while an adequate body of case law was constructed which would cause instability and uncertainty in areas of law previously within the jurisdiction of its predecessor courts,
the Court of Claims and the CCPA. Id. at 1370-71. The court further held that a
panel of the CAFC could not overrule a CCPA decision. Id. The CAFC has subsequently lessened the severity of South Corp. by permitting CAFC panels to modify
holdings that were stated or interpreted too broadly. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885
F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
121. 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1915 (Bd. of Pat. App. and Int. 1992).
122. Id. at 1916. The inventor claimed methods and apparatus for generating
interpolated data for use in a graphics display. Id. The invention calculated the
value of an interstitial graphic data point located between four known graphic data
points. Id. The application contained two claims for methods for performing the
graphics interpolation and two claims for apparatus to perform the graphics interpolation. Id.
123. Id. at 1918-19. See supra note 100 for a discussion of Supreme Court decisions addressing the patentability of mathematical algorithms.
124. Akamatsu, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1921-23.
125. Id. The Board panel cited the PTO's published response regarding the interpretation of Iwahashi.See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the PTO's response to the CAFC's Iwahashi decision.
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Board panel is more important for what it does not say. The opinion fails to mention that the panel issuing the decision was not
the panel originally assigned to hear the appeal.'26 The original
panel interpreted the claims narrowly, as required by the CAFC
in Iwahashi, and thus found in favor of the inventor. 127 However, the Chairman of the Board, Saul Serota, prevented the mailing
of the decision to Akamatsu. 128 A second panel was formed composed of Commissioner Manbeck, Deputy Commissioner Comer,
Assistant Commissioner for Trademarks Samuels, Chairman
Serota and Vice-Chairman Calvert. 2 ' The new panel overturned
the decision of the original panel and affirmed the rejection after
construing Akamatsu's claims broadly.3 0
The EICs became incensed by the actions of the Commissioner. 3' A memorandum signed by thirty-three of the forty-four
EICs was sent to Commissioner Manbeck on April 24, 1992.132
In the memorandum, the Board members expressed their concern
over what they perceived as "an increasing number of instances in
which the composition of panels of the Board... has been manipulated in a manner which interferes with the decisional independence of the Board and gives the appearance that a predetermined or predecided outcome has been reached in cases appealed."'33 The Board members conceded the Commissioner's authority to designate panel members under 35 U.S.C. § 7. However,
the memorandum did question the Commissioner's authority to
"un-designate" one panel and redesignate a completely new panel
for any reason, let alone to reverse a signed decision with which
he disagrees.""
Five days later, Commissioner Manbeck responded.' 3 ' The
Commissioner asserted that he possessed the authority to establish PTO legal policy through decisions by the Board even if redesignation of a Board panel is necessary to ensure the outcome
desired by the Commissioner.'3 6 Although the Commissioner
stated that each member of a panel has only one vote, he added

126. Members of Board of Appeals Complain about Interference with Independence, 44 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1081, at 33 (May 14, 1992)
[hereinafter Board Complains].
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Blommer, supra note 23, at 188.

132. Correspondence Between Board Members and PTO Commissioner on Board
Independence, 44 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1081, at 33 (May 14,
1992) [hereinafter Correspondence].
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 34.
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that he holds the authority to select certain Board members for a
panel even if he knows that those Board members share his opinion on the issue on appeal. 37 Commissioner Manbeck went on to
claim that Congress never intended to create a Board that operated independently from the Commissioner, citing his membership
on the Board and his authority to designate panel members in
support of the proposition. 138 The Commissioner concluded his
memorandum by informing the EICs that they constitute important members of the PTO "team" with the role of assisting the
Commissioner in establishing legal policy. 3 9 This letter indicated that Manbeck intended to stack panels in the future if he
found it necessary to do so.
D. The Commissioner Stacks the Panel with Allies in the
Reconsideration of Ex Parte Alappat
Even though he assured the EIC Board members of their
importance, the Commissioner nonetheless continued to impinge
upon the Board's independence as demonstrated by the reconsideration decision"4 in Ex parte Alappat.'4' The invention in
Alappat related to a means for displaying a smooth waveform on a
digital oscilloscope.' 42 That is, the invention allowed the draw-

137. Correspondence, supra note 132, at 33-35.
138. Id. at 34-35.
139. Id. at 35.
140. "As normally used in the context of administrative adjudication
'reconsideration' implies reexamination, and possibly a different decision by the
entity which initially decided it." BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1272 (6th ed. 1990). A
reconsideration is synonymous to a rehearing for purposes of the patent office. In
re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) [hereinafter Alappat III].
The Board has the authority to grant rehearings to parties receiving an adverse
decision in an appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988).
141. Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340 (Bd. of Pat. App. and Int. 1992) [hereinafter Alappat I].
142. Id. at 1340. The following excerpt from Circuit Judge Rich's opinion in
Alappat III provides an excellent description of the technology involved:
The screen of an oscilloscope is the front of a cathode-ray tube (CRT), which
is like a TV picture tube, whose screen, when in operation, presents an array of pixels (or raster) arranged at intersections of vertical columns and
horizontal rows, a pixel being a spot on the screen which may be illuminated
by directing an electron beam to that spot, each column in the array represents a different time period, and each now represents a different magnitude. An input signal to the oscilloscope is sampled and digitized to provide
a waveform data sequence (vector list), wherein each successive element of
the sequence represents the magnitude of the waveform at a successively
later time. The waveform data sequence is then processed to provide a bit
map, which is a stored data array indicating which pixels are to be illuminated. The waveform ultimately displayed is formed by a group of vectors,
wherein each vector has a straight line trajectory between two points on the
screen at elevations representing the magnitudes of two successive input
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ing of sharper lines on a picture tube which allowed improved
results for the user. One of Alappat's claims expressed all elements of the invention in means-plus-function terms.'4 The examiner rejected the claim for failing to recite patentable subject
matter.'" In so finding, the examiner determined that Alappat
attempted to claim a mathematical algorithm.'4 5 Alappat appealed to the Board."4
A Board panel reversed the examiner's rejection, holding that
the claim constituted statutory subject matter.14 7 The panel conceded that the claim recited a mathematical algorithm. 48 However, after interpreting the means-plus-function terms consistently
with Iwahashi, the panel found that the claim was an application
of the mathematical algorithm.149 The panel held that the claim

signal samples and at horizontal positions representing the timing of the
two samples.
Because a CRT screen contains a finite number of pixels, rapidly rising
and falling portions of a waveform can appear discontinuous or jagged due
to differences in the elevation of horizontally contiguous pixels included in
the waveform. In addition, the presence of 'noise' in an input signal can
cause portions of the waveform to oscillate ....
Moreover, the vertical resolution of the display may be limited by the number of rows of pixels on the
screen.
To overcome these effects, Alappat's invention employs a[] ... system
wherein each vector making up the waveform is represented by [varying] the
illumination intensity of pixels having center points bounding the trajectory
of the vector. The intensity at which each of the pixels is illuminated depends on upon the distance of the center point of each pixel from the trajectory of the vector. Pixels ... lying along an edge of the trace receive illumination decreasing in intensity proportional to the increase in distance ...
from the vector trajectory.
Alappat III, 33 F.3d at 1537.
143. Alappat 1, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1341. Claim 15 specified an apparatus for determining the illumination intensity for pixels whose center points do not lie on the
trajectory between successive signal samples. Id. Claim 15 reads as follows:
15. A rasterizer for converting vectors ... comprising:
(a) means for determining a vertical distance between the endpoints of each
of the vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining an elevation of a row of pixels that is spanned by
the vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation; and
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a predetermined
function of the normalized vertical distance and elevation.
Id.
144. Id. at 1340-41.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1341.
148. Alappat I, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1347-48 (Lindquist, Thomas and Krass, Examiners-in-Chief, disagreeing with the majority of the new decision). The claim recited a series of mathematical operations with a numeric value as the end-product of
the claimed invention. Id. at 1348.
149. Id. The specifications recited conventional electronic structures for per-
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was not an improper attempt to wholly preempt the
algorithm.15 ° In reaching its decision, the panel relied on several
decisions of both the CCPA and the CAFC, including
5
Iwahashi."'
After the panel released its decision, the examiner
52
petitioned for reconsideration,
requesting an expanded panel
53
on reconsideration.
The Commissioner granted the examiner's request for reconsideration with an expanded panel s The Commissioner assigned an expanded eight-member panel consisting of the members of the original panel plus five new members. 155 Coincidentally, the new members of the expanded panel consisted of the
same five Board members who issued the unanimous published
opinion in Akamatsu.1 6 Not surprisingly, the expanded panel
reversed the original panel's decision by a 5-3 vote, with the original panel members disagreeing. 157 The majority used essentially
the same analysis in reaching its decision as that appearing in
Akamatsu."5 s That is, by declining to read the specification into
the claim, the majority found that the claim as recited constituted
an unpatentable mathematical algorithm. 59 The majority also
took the opportunity to use Alappat as a forum for reasserting its
position on Iwahashi by discrediting the value of the holding

forming the functions recited in Claim 15. Id. The application specified that the
means for performing the functions recited in clauses (a) and (b) were two separate
arithmetic logic units (ALUs). Id. Barrel shifters were specified to perform the normalizing function of clause (c). Id. The final outputting functions in clause (d) were
performed by two ROMs. Id.
150. Id. at 1349.
151. Id. at 1348-49; see, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix
Corp., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that the statutory nature of an
apparatus claim is determined with reference to the patent specification); In re
Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that the fact that an apparatus
operates according to an algorithm does not make it nonstatutory); In re Meyer,
688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that claims should be evaluated in view of
the supporting disclosure); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that
claims are patentable that recite plural means for performing various specified
functions which are disclosed to be conventional structures in the art).
152. Alappat I, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1340. "A single request for reconsideration or
modification of the decision may be made if filed within one month from the date of
the original decision." 35 C.F.R. § 1.197(b) (1993).
153. Alappat I, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1340.
154. Id.
155. Id. Commissioner Manbeck added himself, Deputy Commissioner Comer,
Assistant Commissioner Samuels, Chairman Serota, and Vice Chairman Calvert.
Id.
156. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Commissioner's actions directed toward ensuring a favorable decision in Ex parte
Akamatsu.

157. Alappat I, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1340.
158. Id. at 1341-47.
159. Id. at 1344-47.
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based on factual limitations, dismissing the statements of the
CAFC as dicta, and criticizing the Iwahashi court for failing to
properly follow CCPA precedent. 16 0 Obviously disappointed with
the Board decision, Alappat appealed the reconsideration decision
to the CAFC.
The CAFC ordered that the court would hear Alappat's appeal en banc to settle the ongoing dispute between the Commissioner and the court over the proper interpretation of means-plusfunction terms.'6 1 Additionally, the court sua sponte raised the
issues of whether the reconsideration was authorized and if not,
whether the court held jurisdiction to render a decision on the
merits of the appeal. 162 Realizing the potential significance of
the Alappat decision, the court gave the parties ample time to
prepare briefs on the jurisdiction issue and solicited amicus curiae
briefs relating to both jurisdiction and the merits of the appeal. 163
The Alappat court held that the Commissioner possessed the
authority to designate the reconsideration panel but reversed that
panel's rejection of Alappat's claim.' 6 The court acknowledged
the Commissioner's authority pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) to form
expanded panels of the Board and to designate Board members to
serve on such panels. 165 The majority reasoned that language to
the contrary was not present in the statute or the legislative history of § 7(b).' 66 Nevertheless, the court found that the last sen-

160. Id. at 1343-44. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Commissioner's response to the holding in Iwahashi.
161. In re Alappat, 980 F.2d 1439, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Alappat II].
162. Id. at 1439-40. The court directed the parties to prepare briefs addressing
the following three questions:

(1) When a three-member panel of the Board has rendered its decision, does
the Commissioner have the authority to constitute a new panel for purposes
of reconsideration of the first decision?
(2) If the Commissioner lacks such authority, is the decision of the Board for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(4)(A)? If not, does this court have jurisdiction
to reach the merits of the appealed decision?
(3) What is the relationship, if any, between the "reconsideration" action
taken in this case and "rehearings" by the Board provided for in 35 U.S.C. §
7(b)?
Id.
163. Id.
164. Alappat III, 33 F.3d at 1531-32. On the merits, the court upheld the
Iwahashi interpretation of means-plus-function claims. Id. at 1539-41. The CAFC
expressly overruled Lundberg in the interim period between the oral arguments
and the decision in Alappat III. See In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1192-95 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (en banc; 11-0 decision) (holding that examiners must apply § 112, para.
6 during patent examinations and expressly overruling Lundberg and any other
contrary precedent).
165. Alappat III, 33 F.3d at 1531-34.
166. Id. at 1532-33.
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tence of § 7(b) precludes the Commissioner from personally granting a rehearing. 16 7 The court found that the legislative intent
behind § 7(b) operated to eliminate the burden on the Commissioner of hearing appeals.' 6 s In lieu of an appeal, the Commissioner has the option of refusing to authorize issuance of a patent
if he disagrees with the Board's decision, thus subjecting himself
to a mandamus action by the applicant.6 9
An amicus curiae brief from the Federal Circuit Bar Association (FCBA) raised the issues of Board independence and whether
Alappat's due process rights had been violated by the Board's
actions. 7 ° The Alappat court rejected the argument that the
Board operates independently because the plain language of § 7
permits the Commissioner to assign whomever he wishes to sit on
a Board panel.' 7 ' The court dismissed the FCBA's due process
argument because Alappat failed to raise the issue on appeal and
due to the fact that the FCBA did not have standing to raise such
an argument. 72 In Alappat, the court ultimately concluded that
resolution of the issue of whether the Board should operate independently
of the Commissioner should best wait for Congressional
3
action.

7

167. Id. at 1534.
168. Id.

169. Id. at 1535. The Commissioner is not bound by a Board decision to grant a
patent. Id. The Commissioner may refuse to sign the patent. Id. However, if the
Commissioner does refuse, the applicant can bring a mandamus action in a Federal District Court seeking an order to force the Commissioner to sign. Id.
170. Alappat I1, 33 F.3d at 1535-56.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1536.

173. Id. The debate over Board independence existed prior to Akamatsu and
Alappat III and continues even today. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal
Circuit Bar Association, In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (arguing
in favor of the judicial independence of the Board and presenting a survey of the
EICs indicating their dissatisfaction with the current appraisal system which objectively measures EIC performance based on quotas established by the PTO);
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 928 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating
that the Board's adjudicative authority is independent from the Commissioner's
authority to establish regulations); 138 CONG. REC. S16,613-01,S16614 (1992)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) (emphasizing the inappropriateness of the Commissioner redesignating panels which have reached decisions contrary to his views);
Request for Public Comments, 57 FED. REG. 34,123 (1992) (requesting comments
on the structure and operation of the Board); Independence of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 215, 222 (1992) (presenting an analysis
of Board independence and proposing alternative PTO practices and legislation);
Senate Panel Considers Patent Reforms, Patent and Trademark Office Operations,
47 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1170, at 422 (Mar. 10, 1994) (discussing problems related to the previous Commissioner's interference with Board
decisions and suggesting that Congress clarify the patent statutes); Commissioner
Confers Title of 'Judge' on Patent and Trademark Board Members, 46 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1151, at 534 (Oct. 21, 1993) (discussing the PTO's
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III. CONGRESS CAN RESTORE THE INTENDED INDEPENDENCE OF
THE BOARD BY REVISING § 7
Examination of the Congressional debate during the consideration of the Patent Act of 1927 indicates that Congress intended
to prevent the Commissioner from influencing Board decisions. 74 First, the Senate and House Committees specifically
stated that the Commissioner does not possess authority to influence Board decisions.1 75 Second, although the issue of which
Board members compose "The Board" which may grant appeals
was not resolved, the Committees did make clear that "The
Board" does not mean "The Commissioner. " 176 Lastly, when Congress addressed the needs of the PTO in 1927 it did not foresee
the changes in the size of the Board as it exists today. 7 7 Given
these points, Congress should modify the PTO appellate process to
reflect the Board's growth. The rationale of this view is addressed
in this Section.
A. Congress Recognized the Need for the Board to Act as an
Independent JudicialBody

The Senate and the House Committees on Patents determined separately that the Board of Patent Appeals should operate
decision to give the EICs the title "Administrative Patent Judge"); Changes Urged
in Structure and Operation of PTO Appeals Board, 45 PAT. TRADEMARK &

COPY-

J. (BNA) No. 1108, at 75 (Dec. 3, 1992) (discussing the recommendations
made to the PTO by the Senior Executives Association, Intellectual Property Owners Inc. and the AIPLA to reduce the Commissioners involvement in Board decisions and revise the EIC rating system); PTO Automation and Board Autonomy at
Issue in House Hearing on PTO Budget, 44 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) No. 1084, at 102 (June 4, 1992) (discussing Rep. Hughes' "grave concerns"
about the Board's complaints to the Commissioner's interference); Senate Panel
Hears PTO Budget Request, Board Complaints, and PTO Inc. Proposal, 44 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1081, at 34 (May 14, 1992) (discussing Sen.
DeConcini's resolve to eliminate the Commissioner's influence over Board decisions).
174. H.R. REP. No. 1889, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1927) [hereinafter House Report]; S. REP. NO. 1313, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1927) [hereinafter Senate Report];
Procedurein the Patent Office: Hearingson S.4812 Before the Senate Committee on
Patents, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1926) [hereinafter Senate Hearing];Procedure in
the Patent Office: Hearingson H.R. 7563 and H.R. 13487 Before the House Committee on Patents, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1926) [hereinafter House Hearing].
175. See infra notes 178-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
House and Senate debates related to the issue of judicial independence of the
Board.
176. See infra notes 202-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of the House
and Senate debates related to the issue of who constitutes "The Board" for purposes of granting rehearings.
177. See infra notes 217-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the House
and Senate debates related to the issues relevant to the Patent Office in 1927.
RIGHT
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independently of the Commissioner.7 8 The proposed amendments were intended to streamline the appellate process within
the Patent Office by eliminating the direct appeal to the Commissioner. 179 In addition, the Commissioner and two Assistant Commissioners joined the existing five EICs on the Board, thereby
allowing two three-member panels to sit simultaneously. 8 0 At
the same time, a bill to increase the number of EICs to six was
presented to Congress.' The new structure gave the Board two
full time panels and allowed the Commissioner and Assistant
Commissioners to devote their time to other administrative duties. 182
In response to arguments supporting the Commissioner's
participation in Board matters, both the House and Senate committees contemplated a Board free from the influence of the Commissioner. 8 3 Karl Fenning,'8 4 a supporter of the
Commissioner's participation, argued that either the Commissioner or one of the Assistant Commissioners should participate in
every hearing.8 5 Fenning reasoned that one dealing with the
Patent Office might feel slighted if the Commissioner did not personally attend to his matter. 8' The Senate rejected this argument, comparing the Board to the judicial system where a chief
judge does not, and cannot, participate in every decision of the
court.8 7 The Senate Committee also recognized that EICs pos-

178. See Senate Hearing, supra note 174, at 16-23 (statement of Karl Fenning,
Chairman of the Committee on Laws and Rules of the American Patent Law Association, Washington, D.C.); House Hearing,supra note 174, at 20-29 (statement of
Henry D. Williams, of New York City).
179. House Hearing,supra note 174, at 24-26.
180. Senate Hearing,supra note 174, at 20-21.
181. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 1760, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1927) (discussing the
need to increase the staff in the Patent Office due to increases in patent applications and appeals). The amendment was approved as The Act of Feb. 14, 1927, ch.
139, § 1, 44 Stat. 1098.
182. Senate Hearing,supra note 174, at 21.
183. Senate Hearing, supra note 174, at 16-23 (statement of Karl Fenning);
House Hearing,supra note 174, at 20-29 (statement of Henry D. Williams).
184. The speaker, Karl Fenning, was the Chairman of the Committee on Laws
and Rules of the American Patent Law Association and had previously served as
an Assistant Commissioner in the Patent Office. Senate Hearing, supra note 174,
at 9, 16-17. Additionally, Fenning was a member of the committee that drafted the
proposed legislation. Id. at 15.
185. Senate Hearing,supra note 174, at 15, 18; House Hearing, supra note 174,
at 20.
186. The speaker, Karl Fenning stated, "the applicant will go to his Senator or
his Congressman and complain, 'I have not been looked after by the commissioner;
the head of the office has not considered this matter.'" Senate Hearing, supra note
174, at 18.
187. See id. at 17-18 (statement by Sen. David W. Stewart of Iowa).
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sess the expertise necessary to handle the difficult cases.' The
House rejected Fenning's argument, by expressing their reluctance to "tie down" the Commissioner by forcing him to sit on
Boards.' 89 Even the Commissioner of the Patent Office at the
time of these hearings declined to support Fenning by noting that
the ever-growing Patent Office workload required changing of the
existing procedures to allow the Commissioner more freedom. 9 °
Furthermore, the proposed bill did not provide a mechanism
for review of Board decisions reversing rejections by the examiners. 191 Fenning also disagreed with this and expressed his fear
that the Commissioner would lose some of his supervisory power
if he did not possess the authority to force a reconsideration proceeding upon the applicant. "2Commissioner Robertson supported Fenning in this argument, 93 but the House Committee flatly
rejected their argument."" The representatives reiterated the
judicial character of the Board as well as the need for its independence from external influences. 195

188. Id. at 18.

189. House Hearing,supra note 174, at 21-22 (statements of Mr. Otto Barnett,
President American Patent Law Association, Chicago, Ill. and Mr. A. C. Paul,
Chairman of the Patent Section of the American Bar Association).
190. Senate Hearing, supra note 174, at 18 (statement by Hon. Thomas E. Robertson, Commissioner of Patents). "The conditions are so vastly different that the
procedure must be changed to meet the present conditions." Id.
191. See supra note 169 and accompanying text for a discussion of an applicant's
right to a mandamus action where the Commissioner refuses to sign a patent.
192. Senate Hearing,supra note 174, at 19-20; House Hearing,supra note 174, at

22-28.
193. House Hearing, supra note 174, at 23-24 (statement by Commissioner Robertson). "I think it [a reconsideration forced upon an applicant] is a safety valve in
extreme cases. .

. ."

Id. at 24.

194. See id. at 25-26.
195. Id. The Representatives were very assertive in rejecting Fenning's view:
Mr. Hammer. You are going on the theory that these examiners sustain
the same relation to the commissioner that the President's Cabinet does to
the President? These other gentlemen are going upon the theory that these
three men sitting at the hearing are an independent court and should not be
restrained and no sword should hang over their heads, and that appeals to
me very much....
That is an extreme view. Not that the three do it-that is what you
have in your head, that is not a cabinet-those are independent judges with
the same power and same authority he has, and they should be free to do as
they think right without anybody that may reverse them except duly constituted authorities. ...
Mr. Rogers. Answering Mr. Perkins' suggestion, that was discussed at
Denver, to erect an independent board of three judges who were not going to
be reversed by outside authority. Those questions are essentially judicial
and they ought to be....

The Chairman. I think Mr. Rogers is absolutely correct in this matter. I
can not understand why if a board of three of these examiners hear and determine a case, somebody who has never heard this case at all should have
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The House Committee also emphasized that allowing the
Commissioner to grant rehearings would fail to moderate the increasing workload of the Commissioner and the Board.'96 Moreover, the House Committee recognized that granting the Commissioner such authority would serve to frustrate the remedial purpose of the bill.'97 That is, if Congress allowed the Commissioner
to require rehearings, the Act would merely rename the then
existing appellate process, not eliminate it.' 98
As shown above, the legislative history of the 1927 Patent
Act indicates that Congress did not provide the Commissioner
with the authority to grant either appeals or rehearings. Therefore, the Commissioner's actions in Akamatsu and Alappat went
beyond the scope of his authority.' 99 Moreover, the Board panels
assembled by the Commissioner did not possess the power to
render legally binding decisions. 20 0 The composition of a Board
panel must conform strictly to the provisions of the enabling statute to possess jurisdictional power to render a decision. 2 1' The
only group within the Patent Office with the authority to grant a
rehearing is "The Board," whomever that may be.
B. "The Board" Might be the Panel, Might be the Entire Board,
but Definitely is Not the Commissioner
Although the last sentence of § 7(b) states that "only the
Board ... has the authority to grant rehearings,"' °' the House
and Senate Committees struggled over the issue of who should
possess the authority to grant and decide rehearings.' ° ' As a

the right to come in and grant a rehearing. It seems to me it would be up to
the board to grant a rehearing if certain evidence was brought showing it
ought to be done, and if not there ought not to be a rehearing.
Id. Such an unequivocal rejection of Fenning's suggestion can leave no doubt about
the intent of the House Committee.
196. Id. at 26 (statement by Edward S. Rogers, Chairman of the Patent and
Trade Mark Association of the American Bar Association).
197. Id.

198. Id.
199. Alappat III, 33 F.3d at 1571-77 (Mayer & Michel, JJ., dissenting on the
issue of jurisdiction) (reasoning that because the Commissioner did not act in ac-

cordance with the law, the reconsideration of a Board decision was not a decision
of the Board within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A), and the court did not
have jurisdiction over the merits of the appeal); In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 869
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating the view that an improperly constituted board may not
render a valid decision over which the court could exercise review jurisdiction).
200. Alappat III, 33 F.3d at 1571-77.

201. See McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 62 (1902) (stating that a body or
tribunal created by statute "must be convened and constituted in entire conformity
with the provisions of the statute, or else it is without jurisdiction.").
202. 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988).
203. See Senate Hearing, supra note 174, at 19-23; House Hearing, supra note
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general rule, rehearings are both granted and conducted by the
same court or body that initially heard the case. 20 ' During the
hearings on the 1927 Patent Act, the House and Senate Committees used the term "board" interchangeably to denote both the
three member panel and the entire eight or nine-member Board of
Appeals.0 5 While never clearly stating whether "the Board" consisted of the panel assigned to an appeal or the entire Board,
Congress never intended "the Board" to denote the Commissioner
or any other subset of the Board of Appeals. 2 ' The idea of the
Commissioner granting rehearings was dismissed by both the
House and Senate Committees as contrary to the purpose of the
20 7
bill.
Today, proponents of the Commissioner's involvement in
rehearings point to the Congressional intent to preserve the
Commissioner's supervisory authority. Commissioner Manbeck
believed that Congress reserved to him the power to dictate policy
through Board decisions.0 8 In Alappat, Judge Rich focused on
the supervisory authority of the Commissioner and his express

174, at 23-29.
204. A rehearing is a:
Second consideration of cause for purpose of calling to court's or administrative board's attention any error, omission, or oversight in first consideration.
A retrial of issues which presumes notice to parties entitled thereto and
opportunity for them to be heard... Reconsideration of a case by the same
court in which the original determination was made....
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (6th ed. 1990).
205. House Hearing,supra note 174, at 26-27. The Chairman noted, "It seems to
me it would be up to the board to grant a rehearing if certain evidence was
brought showing it ought to be done. . . ." Id. In response, Mr. Bloom questioned,
"What board?" Id. From later in the hearing:
Mr. Perkins. When three members give a decision does the decision become
the decision of the entire board?
Mr. Fenning. I understand it does.
Mr. Perkins. But you have a right under that clause to grant a rehearing of
the entire board?
Mr. Fenning. No; it will be the members of the board that has the appeal.
Mr. Bloom. Where do you get that?
Mr. Fenning. Because the case has been assigned to those three members as
representing the board.
Mr. Bloom. How do you get back to the full board?
Mr. Fenning. I do not go back to the full board.
Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
206. Senate Hearing,supra note 174, at 19-23; House Hearing,supra note 174, at
23-29.
207. See supra notes 178-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Congress's intent to withhold the authority for the Commissioner to grant rehearings.
208. See supra notes 126-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Commissioner Manbeck's response to protests over his interference with Board independence.
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authority to designate board members in finding that the Commissioner acted properly. 9 Chief Judge Archer approved the
Commissioner's actions in Alappat, citing the express authority
granted to the Commissioner by Congress to designate Board
members and to form expanded panels.210
Although the judge's arguments were well-reasoned and
tracked the historical actions of the Patent Office, he ignored
crucial aspects of the House and Senate Committee debates. In
exchange for an increase in efficiency within the Patent Office, the
Commissioner relinquished the power to control appeal decisions. 211 Thus, the Commissioner does not possess the authority
to dictate patent policy through control over the Board.2 12
The reason for granting the Commissioner authority to designate panel members was meant to allow him to align the technical expertise of the Board members with the subject matter of the
appeal,213 not to stack panels in his favor.214 In Alappat, Chief
Judge Archer pointed out that the House and Senate "viewed] the
prospective legislation as permitting either the full board or less
than the full board to rehear a case.... 25 Perhaps this interpretation of the Commissioner's authority is reasonable given the
circumstances within the PTO today. However, the House and
Senate view of "less than the full board" meant only the original
panel - nothing more and nothing less.216 Thus, when read in
the context of the hearings, the legislative history confirms that
the Commissioner exceeded his authority by granting rehearings
and designating predisposed panels in Akamatsu and Alappat.

209. Alappat III, 33 F.3d at 1533-35.
210. Id. (Archer, C.J., concurring on the jurisdiction issue and dissenting on the
merits).
211. Id. at 1549-50. See supra notes 174-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need to improve efficiency in the Patent Office.
212. See House Hearing,supra note 174, at 25-27.
213. Senate Hearing,supra note 174, at 21 (statement of A.C. Paul, Chairman of
the Patent Section of the American Bar Association). Chairman Paul noted:
And as my associate here suggests there may be a case that involves chemical patents, and another involving electrical patents, and the commissioner
knows the qualities of these men and their capabilities, and he may assign
to a certain case three men who are particularly skilled in a particular art.
Id.
214. See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Congress's intent in giving the Commissioner the authority to appoint panel members.
215. Alappat IIl, 33 F.3d at 1550.
216. See Senate Hearing, supra note 174, at 16-23; House Hearing, supra note
174, at 20-29.
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C. Congress Must Clarify the Appellate Process in the
Present-DayPTO by Amending § 7
The bill presented to Congress which constituted the Patent
Act of 1927 was intended to address the backlog of appeals in the
Patent Office existing in 1926 and 1927.2"7 The revised procedures resulting from its enactment allowed the then current staff
in the Patent Office to reduce the duration of appeals within the
office.2"' The Senate and House hearings focused on the relationship between the Commissioner and the five or six EICs on
the Board." 9 The record is devoid of any discussions relating to
future expansion in the Patent Office. 220 The statute as it operates today does not address the needs of an office that has grown
to over forty EICs.
The Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner were
added to the Board for the sole purpose of expediting appeals.2 21
With five EICs, the Commissioner or one Assistant would partici222
pate so two three-member panels could sit simultaneously.
With the addition of a sixth EIC,223 three panels, each consisting of three members, could sit simultaneously if all members of
the Board were available. 22 Since 1927, the size of the Board
has increased, 225 providing greater flexibility in staffing Board
panels.2 6 As such, the need for the participation of the Commis-

217. House Report, supra note 174, at 2-3. It was estimated that each year the
Patent office received 80,000 to 90,000 patent applications, 1,900 appeals to the
EICs, and 400 appeals to the Commissioner. Id. at 3. The turnaround time for
appeals was estimated as at least nine months at the EICs level and six months at
the Commissioner level. Id. at 2.
218. Senate Hearing,supra note 174, at 9.
219. Id. at 20-21.
220. Section 7 now provides for an unlimited number of EICs. 35 U.S.C. § 7
(1988). In 1930, the Board was expanded from six to nine EICs. Act of Apr. 11,
1930, ch. 132, § 1, 46 STAT. 155. In 1958, Congress expanded the Board from nine
to fifteen EICs. Act of Sept. 6, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-933, § 1, 72 STAT. 1793. Congress has since eliminated the restriction on the maximum number of EICs. Act of
Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 4, 96 STAT. 319.
221. See Senate Hearing,supra note 174, at 20-21.
222. Id.
223. Act of Feb. 14, 1927, ch. 139, § 1, 44 STAT. 1098.
224. Senate Hearing, supra note 174, at 21.
225. See supra note 220 (detailing the amendments that gradually enlarged the
Board).
226. 35 U.S.C. § 7(c) (1988). In relevant part:
(c) Whenever the Commissioner considers it necessary, in order to keep
current the work of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the Commissioner may designate any patent examiner of the primary examiner
grade or higher, having the requisite ability, to serve as EIC for periods not
exceeding six months each. An examiner so designated shall be qualified to
act as a member of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Not more
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sioner and the Assistant Commissioners has lessened.
The drafters of the bill intended to give the Commissioner
the ability to efficiently allocate the resources of the Patent Office.227 This enabled the Commissioner to assign EICs to appeals
based on the underlying subject matter of the application.228
With only five or six EICs, the Board was constrained by the lack
of availability of EICs with the requisite skills to hear certain
appeals. 229 Today, however, appeal assignment is considerably
more flexible and efficient since forty or more EICs and temporary
EICs are available to hear appeals.23 °
Furthermore, the debate over the meaning of "the Board" did
not address the possibility that the Board would grow to almost
fifty members.231 An eight or nine-member board can realistically convene and grant requests for rehearings. However, the appellate process would result in a substantial burden on the PTO if
the more than forty EICs constituting "the Board" must personally address every request for rehearing. Therefore, § 7 should vest
sole authority for granting rehearings in the original panel assigned to the appeal to make the appellate process manageable for
the modern PTO.
The above analysis indicates that the Patent Office has outgrown the usefulness of the provisions of § 7 and the appellate
process. Moreover, permitting the Commissioner to take control
will return the PTO to the pre-Act of 1927 appellate process.232
Accordingly, the statute requires amendment to more clearly define the relationship between the Commissioner and the Board, in
particular the judicial independence of the Board.
CONCLUSION

The proposed amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 7 set forth in the
Appendix would clarify the roles of the Commissioner of the PTO

than one of the members of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
hearing an appeal or determining an interference may be an examiner so
designated.
Id.
227. Senate Hearing, supra note 174, at 21.
228. Id.; see supra note 214 (describing A.C. Paul's concept of the proper use of
authority by the Commissioner to appoint Board panels aligning EIC skills with
appeal subject matter).
229. Senate Hearing, supra note 174, at 20.
230. See Correspondence, supra note 132, at 43 n.1. Generally, the members of
the Board have expertise in either electrical, mechanical, or chemical disciplines.
Id. Panel assignments are made randomly within the technical discipline based on
the subject matter of the appeal. Id.
231. Senate Hearing, supra note 174, at 19-23; House Hearing, supra note 174, at
22-29.
232. House Hearing,supra note 174, at 26 (statement by Edward S. Rogers).
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and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in processing
appeals. The amendment will establish the Board as an independent quasi-judicial body, bound by the policies and procedures of
the PTO, but free from interference by the Commissioner. Additionally, the Commissioner will retain control of PTO policy
through a discretionary appeal to the CAFC of Board decisions
that are contrary to PTO policy or judicial precedent. This amendment will put the appellate process in line with the intent of the
drafters of the Act of 1927, and service the current and future
needs of an ever expanding PTO.
Scott E. Baxendale
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APPENDIX
Proposed PatentAppeals Statute 35 U.S.C. § 7:
§ 7. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.
(a) The examiners-in-chief shall be persons of competent legal
knowledge and scientific ability, who shall be appointed to the
.. mpetitive rvi classified civil service. The Commisi.ner., the

Dzputy Cemmissoner, the Assistwat Ccmmioicnro

and the

examiners-in-chief shall constitute the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences.
(b) The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners
upon applications for patents and shall determine priority and
patentability of invention in interferences declared under section
135(a) of this title. Each appeal and interference shall be heard by
a panel of at least three members of the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences, who shall be designated by the Commiooicnc.
at random. Only the -ard ef -PAtntAppeals and interfcrnz..
original panel designated to hear the appeal or interference has
authority to grant rehearings.
(c) The Commissioner may, on written request of an examiner,
appeal decisions of panels of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences approving applications for patents. The examiner
must show that the panel decision is inconsistent with Patent and
Trademark Office policy, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences precedent, or judicialprecedent.
(eXd) Whenever the Commissioner considers it necessary, in order to keep current the work of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences,....

